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Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are: (i) new import varieties available
to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive
firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains
can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source
is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation
curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure
function for consumers, which in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new
goods and endogenous markups.
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  One of the great achievements of international trade theory in the last three decades is the 
incorporation of the monopolistic competition model. The need to include increasing returns to 
scale in trade theory was recognized as early as Graham (1923; see also Ethier 1982), and in the 
Canadian context, by Eastman and Stykolt (1967) and Melvin (1969). Still, it was not until the 
formalization of the monopolistic competition model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in parallel 
with Spence (1976) and Lancaster (1979), that a set of global equilibrium conditions that avoided 
the problems of large firms and multiple equilibria could be developed. That set of equilibrium 
conditions was first written down by Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981).
1  
  There is no doubt that these developments have had important policy implications. For 
example, the simulation results of Harris (1984a,b) demonstrated large gains to Canada from free 
trade with the U.S., and were very influential in convincing policy makers to proceed with the 
Canada-U.S. free trade agreement in 1989; that agreement in turn paved the way for the North 
American free trade agreement in 1994. Subsequent empirical work for Canada by Trefler 
(2004), as well as Head and Ries (1999, 2001), confirmed the efficiency gains for Canada due to 
opening trade, though not in the manner predicted by Krugman’s work. But a comprehensive 
empirical assessment of the gains from trade under monopolistic competition has not yet been 
made. The goal of this paper is to describe how these gains can be measured, using methods that 
draw heavily on duality theory from Diewert (1974, 1976). 
  The monopolistic competition model predicts three sources of gains from trade that are  
not present in traditional models. First, there are the consumer gains from having access to new 
import varieties of differentiated products. Those gains have recently been measured for the 
                                                 
1  See also the early contributions of Dixit and Norman (1980, chapter 9), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981); 
these various approaches were integrated by Helpman and Krugman (1985).   2
United States by Broda and Weinstein (2006), using the methods from Feenstra (1994), as 
described in section 2. Their approach assumes a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function for consumers, in which case the import varieties are analogous to “new goods” in the 
utility function. We show that the gains from trade depend on the import share and the elasticity 
of substitution. 
The extension of the monopolistic competition model to allow for heterogeneous firms, 
due to Melitz (2003), leads to a second source of gains from the self-selection of more efficient 
firms into export markets. This activity drives out less efficient firms and therefore raises overall 
productivity. This self-selection of firms was demonstrated for Canada by Trefler (2004) 
following the free trade agreement with the U.S. We argue that this self-selection can still be 
interpreted as a gain from product variety, but now on the export side of the economy rather than 
for imports. Surprisingly, the consumer gains from new import varieties do not appear in this 
case, because they cancel out with disappearing domestic varieties. This finding, demonstrated in 
section 3, helps to explain the theoretical results of Arkolakis et al (2008a), where the gains from 
trade depend on the import share but are otherwise independent of the elasticity of substitution in 
consumption.
2 Rather, the gains come from the production side of the economy, where the self-
selection of firms leads to a constant-elasticity transformation curve between domestic and 
export varieties, with an elasticity depending on the Pareto parameter of productivity draws.  
  Third, the monopolistic competition model also allows for gains from a reduction in firm 
markups due to import competition. This third source of gains was stressed in Krugman (1979), 
but has been absent from much of the later literature due to the assumption of CES preferences, 
leading to constant markups. In section 4, I introduce the translog expenditure function into the 
monopolistic competition model, and summarize current research  in Bergin and Feenstra (2009) 
                                                 
2  These results have been generalized in Arkolakis, Arnaud and Rodríguez-Clare (2009).   3
and Feenstra and Weinstein (2009). I argue that the translog unit-expenditure function is 
tractable even as the number of product varieties is changing, as with monopolistic competition. 
It can be expected to lead to estimable formulas for the gains from product variety and the effect 
of imports on reducing markups. Conclusions are given in section 5. 
 
2.  Consumer Benefits from Import Variety 
  We start with the consumer gains from import variety. From a technical point of view, 
measuring the benefits of new import varieties is equivalent to the so-called “new goods” 
problem in index number theory. That has always been a favorite problem of Erwin Diewert’s, 
and arises because the price for a product before it is available is not observed, so we don’t know 
what price to enter in an index number formula. The answer given many years ago by Hicks 
(1940) was that the relevant price of a product before it is available is the “reservation price” for 
consumers, namely, a price so high that demand is zero. Once the product appears on the market 
then it has a lower price, determined by supply and demand. The fall in the price from its 
“reservation” level to the actual price can be used in an index number formula to obtain the 
consumer gains from the appearance of that new good. 
  For the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, we immediately run into 
a problem with implementing this suggestion because the reservation price for any good is 
infinite: the demand curve approaches the vertical axis as the price approaches infinity.
3 But 
provided that the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, then the area under the demand 
curve is bounded above, as shown in Figure 1, where the ratio of areas A/B = 1/(σ – 1) is easily 
calculated for a demand curve with elasticity σ. The second problem we run into is how to 
express these consumer gains when there is not just one but many new goods available. 
                                                 
3  Feenstra (2006) shows that an infinite reservation price leads to a well-behaved limit for the “quadratic mean of 
order r” index number formula of Diewert (1976), providing an alternative proof of Theorem 1 below.   4
CES Utility Function 
  To address this problem, we will work with the non-symmetric CES function, 
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For simplicity, first consider the case where It-1 = It = I, so there is no change in the set of goods, 
and also bit-1 = bit, so there is no change in tastes. We assume that the observed purchases qit are 
optimal for the prices and utility, that is,  ) p / e ( U q it t it ∂ ∂ = . Then the index number due to Sato 
(1976) and Vartia (1976) shows us how to measure the ratio of unit-expenditures: 
 
Theorem 1 (Sato, 1976; Vartia, 1976) 
If the set of goods available is fixed at It-1 = It = I, taste parameters are constant, bit-1 = bit,  and 
observed quantitites are optimal, then: 
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  The numerator in (4) is the “logarithmic mean” of the shares  ) I ( sit  and  ) I ( s 1 it− , and lies 
in-between these two shares, while the denominator ensures that the weights  ) I ( wi  sum to unity. 
The special formula for these weights in (4) is needed to precisely measure the ratio of unit-
expenditures in (3), but in practice the Sato-Vartia formula will give very similar results to using 
other weights, such as  )] I ( s ) I ( s [ ) I ( w 1 it it 2
1
i − + = , as used for the Törnqvist price index. In both 
cases, the geometric mean formula in (3) applies. The important point from Theorem 1 is that 
goods with high taste parameters ai will also tend to have high weights, so even without knowing 
the true values of ai, the exact ratio of unit-expenditures is obtained. 
  Now consider the case where the set of goods is changing over time, but some of the 
goods are available in both periods, so that  ∅ ≠ ∩ − t 1 t I I .  We again let e(p,I) denote the unit-
expenditure function defined over the goods within the set I, which is a non-empty subset of 
those goods available both periods,  ∅ ≠ ∩ ⊆ − t 1 t I I I .  We sometimes refer to the set I as the 
“common set of goods.” Then the ratio  ) I , p ( e / ) I , p ( e 1 t t −  is still measured by the Sato-Vartia 
index in the above theorem.  Our interest is in the ratio  ) I , p ( e / ) I , p ( e 1 t 1 t t t − − , which can be 
measured as follows: 
 
Theorem 2 (Feenstra, 1994) 
Assume that bit-1 = bit for  ∅ ≠ ∩ ⊆ ∈ − t 1 t I I I i , and that the observed quantities are optimal.  
Then for σ > 1: 
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where the weights wi(I) are constructed from the expenditure shares sit(I) ≡ ∑ ∈I i it it it it q p q p a s  
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  Each of the terms λτ(I) < 1 can be interpreted as the period τ expenditure on the good in 
the common set I, relative to the period τ total expenditure.  Alternatively, this can be interpreted 
as one minus the period τ expenditure on “new” goods (not in the set I), relative to the period τ 
total expenditure.  When there is a greater number of new goods in period t, this will tend to 
lower the value of λt(I), which leads to a greater fall in the ratio of unit costs in (5), by an amount 
that depends on the elasticity of substitution.  
  The importance of the elasticity of substitution can be seen from Figure 2, where we 
suppose that the consumer minimizes the expenditure needed to obtain utility along the 
indifference curve AD. If initially only good 1 is available, then the consumer chooses point A 
with the budget line AB. When good 2 becomes available, the same level of utility can be 
obtained with consumption at point C. Then the drop in the cost of living is measured by the 
inward movement of the budget line from AB to the line through C, and this shift depends on the 
convexity of the indifference curve, or the elasticity of substitution.  
 
Krugman (1980) Model 
  Turning to the international trade application, we will suppose that the utility function in 
(1) applies to the purchases of a good from various source countries  t I i∈ . That is, the elasticity 
of substitution we are interested in is the Armington (1969) elasticity between the source 
countries for imports. We refer to the source countries as providing varieties of the differentiated   7
good, so the gains being measured in (5) are the gains from import variety. In this case, we can 
compare the formula in (5) with the gain from trade obtained in the model of Krugman (1980), as 
analyzed by Arkolakis et al (2008a). 
  In particular, suppose there are any number of countries, where the representative 
consumer in each has a CES utility function with elasticity σ > 1. Labor is the only factor of 
production and there is a single monopolistically competitive sector, with no other goods.
4 Firms 
face a fixed cost of f to manufacture any good, and an iceberg transport cost to sell it abroad, but 
no other fixed cost for exports. Then it is well known that with profit-maximization  
and zero profits through free entry, the output of each firm is fixed at the amount:
5 
      ϕ − σ = f ) 1 ( q ,        ( 7 )  
where ϕ is the productivity of the firm, i.e. the number of units of output per unit of labor. With 
the population of L, the full-employment condition is then: 
     f N ] f ) / q [( N L σ = + ϕ = ,       ( 8 )  
which determines the number of product varieties produced in equilibrium as  . f / L N σ =  This 
condition holds under autarky or trade, so opening a country to trade has no impact on the 
number of varieties produced within a country. 
  The gains from opening trade can be measured by the ratio of real wages under free trade 
and autarky. With labor as the only factor of production we can normalize wages at unity, so the 
gains from trade are simply measured by the drop in the cost of living, which is the inverse of 
(5). The “common” set of goods are those domestic varieties that are available both in autarky 
and under trade. Then the Sato-Vartia index PSV is just the change in the price of the domestic 
                                                 
4 In particular, we are ruling out the additively-separable numeraire good sometimes introduced into this model to 
obtain a “home market” effect; see Krugman (1980). 
5  See Arkolakis et al (2008a, p. 3).   8
varieties, and with constant markups that is the change in home wages, which we have 
normalized to unity. So the gains from trade are measured by  ) 1 /( 1
1 t t ) / ( − σ −
− λ λ  in (5). The 
denominator of that ratio reflects the disappearance of domestic varieties, i.e. those varieties 
available in period t-1 but not in period t. As we have shown above, there are no disappearing 
domestic varieties in this model, so λt-1 = 1. The numerator λt measures the expenditure on the 
domestic varieties relative to total expenditure with trade, or one minus the import share. The 
gains from trade are therefore 
) 1 /( 1
t
− σ − λ , which is precisely the formula obtained by Arkolakis et 
al (2008b). While this formula is not too surprising, it will take on greater significance when we 
compare it to the results from the Melitz (2003) model, in the next section. 
  Broda and Weinstein (2006) measure these gains from trade for the U.S. They define a 
good as a 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) category, or before 1989, as a 7-digit Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (TSUSA) category. The imports from various source countries are 
the varieties available for each good. The ratio  ) / ( 1 t t − λ λ  is constructed for each good, using the 
expenditure on new and disappearing source countries. In addition, they estimate σ for each 
good, using the GMM method from Feenstra (1994), which exploits heteroskedasticity across 
countries to identify this elasticity. Putting these together, they measure  ) 1 /( 1
1 t t ) / ( − σ −
− λ λ  for 
30,000 goods available in the HS and TSUSA data. For the TSUSA data they used 1972 as the 
base year and measured the gains from new supply countries up to 1988, and then for the HS 
data they used 1990 as the base year and measured the gains from new supplying countries up to 
2001.
6 Aggregating over goods, they obtain an estimate of the gains from trade for the US due to 
the expansion of import varieties, which amount to 2.6% of GDP in 2001. 
                                                 
6  1989 is omitted because West and East Germany unified then, making comparisons with later years difficult.   9
  Two features of Broda and Weinstein’s methods deserve special mention. First, by 
measuring the expenditure on new supplying countries relative to a base year, they are following 
the hypothesis of Theorem 2 that the “common” set of countries should be those with constant 
taste parameters. In contrast, when countries first start exporting goods, it is reasonable to expect 
that the demand curve in the importing country shifts out over some number of years, as 
consumers become informed about the product. Broda and Weinstein are allowing for such shifts 
for new and disappearing countries after the base year, and all such changes in demand  for these 
countries are incorporated into the λτ terms in Theorem 2. That is the correct way to measure the 
gains from new import varieties.
7 
  Second, Broda and Weinstein (2006) did not incorporate any changes in the number of 
U.S. varieties into their estimation, nor include the U.S. as a source country in the estimation of 
the elasticity of substitution for each good. That is the correct approach only under the limited 
case where the number of U.S. varieties is constant. While that is true under our assumptions in 
the model of Krugman (1980), it is certainly not the case in more general models: we could 
expect that increases in import variety would result in some reduction in domestic varieties. In 
that case, the gains from import varieties would be offset by the welfare loss from reduced 
domestic varieties. That potential loss was not addressed by Broda and Weinstein (2006), and we 
shall begin to address it in the remainder of the paper.  
 
3.  Producer Benefits from Output Variety 
  While we have so far restricted out attention to σ > 1 in the utility and expenditure 
functions (1) and (2), a wider range of values for this elasticity can be considered. In particular, if  
                                                 
7  In addition, countries that are suspected of selling a changing range of product varieties within each HS good 
should be excluded from the set I, and instead included in the λτ terms.   10
0 < σ  then instead of obtaining convex indifference curves from (1) for a fixed level of Ut, we  
obtain a concave transformation curve as shown in Figure 3.
8 The parameter Ut in this case 
measures the resources devoted to production of the goods  t it I i , q ∈ , and the elasticity of the 
transformation curve (measured as a positive number) equals  σ − . This reinterpretation of (1) 
comes from Diewert (1976), who uses the general term “aggregator function” to refer to utility 
functions, production function, or transformation functions for an economy. 
  To make this reinterpretation explicit, when  0 < σ  we will denote its positive value by 
σ − ≡ ω , which is the elasticity of transformation. Then we will rewrite (1) using labor resources 
Lt to replace utility Ut, obtaining: 
    . 0 , 0 a , q a L it
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where the exponent appearing on (λt/λt-1) is now negative. In other words, the appearance of 
“new outputs,” so that λt < 1, will raise revenue on the producer side of the economy. 
To understand where this increase in revenue is coming from, consider the transformation  
                                                 
8 Notice that the range  1 0 ≤ σ ≤  cannot be considered, since then all goods are essential in (1), with a zero quantity 
for any single good resulting in zero for the entire CES aggregate. In that case the welfare gain from a new good is 
infinite.   11
curve in Figure 3.  If only good 1 is available, then the economy would be producing at the 
corner A, with revenue shown by the line AB. Then if good 2 becomes available to producers, 
the new equilibrium will be at point C, with an increase in revenue. This illustrates the benefits 
of output variety. In Figure 4 we illustrate the same idea in a partial equilibrium diagram, for a 
supply curve with constant elasticity ω. When the good becomes available for production, there 
is an effective price increase from the reservation price for producers (which is zero with a 
constant-elasticity supply curve) to the actual price. The gain in producer surplus is area C, and 
measured relative to total sales C+D, we can readily compute that C/(C+D) = 1/(ω+1). 
While this reinterpretation of our earlier consumer model is mathematically valid, there is 
a problem in its application to international trade: the transformation curve between two outputs 
is often taken to be linear rather than strictly concave. That is the case in the Ricardian model, 
for example, or in the transformation curve (8) in Krugman’s (1980) model. In that case, the 
gains from output variety vanish. So the question arises as to whether the strictly concave case 
we illustrate in Figure 3 has any practical application? 
We will now argue that the case of a strictly concave transformation curve is indeed 
relevant, and in fact, arises in the generalization of the monopolistic competition model due to 
Melitz (2003). Melitz assumes that labor is the only factor of production, but he allows firms to 
differ in their productivities ϕ. In the equilibrium with zero expected profits, only firms above 
some cutoff productivity  * ϕ  survive; and of these, only firms with productivities above 
*
*
x ϕ > ϕ  actually export. We will argue that the endogenous determination of these cutoff 
productivities leads to a strictly concave constant-elasticity transformation curve between 
domestic and export varieties, adjusted for the quantity produced of each. 
   12
Melitz (2003) model 
  We outline here a two country version of the Melitz (2003) model that does not assume 
symmetry across the countries. We focus on the home country H, while denoting foreign 
variables with the superscript F. At home there is a mass of M firms operating in equilibrium. 
Each period, a fraction δ of these firms go bankrupt and are replaced by new entrants. Each new 
entrant pays a fixed cost of fe to receive a draw ϕ of productivity from a cumulative distribution 
), ( G ϕ  which gives rise to the marginal cost of  ϕ / w , where w is the wage and labor is the only 
factor of production. Only those firms with productivity above a cutoff level  * ϕ  find it 
profitable to actually produce (the cutoff level will be determined below). Letting Me denote the 
mass of new entrants, then  e M *)] ( G 1 [ ϕ − firms successfully produce. In a stationary equilibrium, 
these should replace the firms going bankrupt, so that: 
      M M *)] ( G 1 [ e δ = ϕ −   .    (12)   
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where  ϕ ∂ ϕ ∂ = ϕ / ) ( G ) ( g  is the density function. 
  Home and foreign consumers both have CES preferences that are symmetric over product 
varieties.  Given home expenditure of wL, the revenue earned by a home firm from selling at  
the price  ) ( p ϕ  is: 
    wL
P
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where  ) ( q ϕ  is the quantity sold and 
H P  is the home CES price index. The profit-maximizing 














) ( p .            (15) 
Using this, we can calculate variable profits from domestic sales as  σ ϕ = ϕ ϕ − ϕ / ) ( r ) ( q ) / w ( ) ( r.  
The lowest productivity firm that just breaks even in the domestic market there satisfies the zero- 
cutoff-profit (ZCP) condition: 
     wf / *) ( r = σ ϕ      ⇒  * f ) 1 ( *) ( q ϕ − σ = ϕ ,    (16) 
where f is the fixed labor cost.  Note that this cutoff condition for the marginal firm is identical to 
what is obtained in Krugman’s (1980) model, in (7), for all firms.  
While firms with productivities  * ϕ ≥ ϕ  find it profitable to produce for the domestic 
market, only those with higher productivities  * *
x ϕ > ϕ ≥ ϕ  find it profitable to export. A home 
exporting firm faces the iceberg transport costs of  1 ≥ τ  meaning that τ units must be sent in 
order for one unit to arrive in the foreign country. Letting  ) ( px ϕ  and  ) ( qx ϕ  denote the price 
received and quantity shipped at the factory-gate,
 the revenue earned by the exporter is:  
    * L * w
P
) ( p














= ϕ ϕ = ϕ ,      ( 1 7 )  
where 
F P  is the aggregate CES price in the foreign country, and w*L* is foreign expenditure. 
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The variable profits from export sales are therefore  σ ϕ = ϕ ϕ − ϕ / ) ( r ) ( q ) / w ( ) ( r x x x , so the ZCP 
condition for the exporting firm is: 
    x
*
x x wf / ) ( r = σ ϕ    ⇒    *
x x
*
x x f ) 1 ( ) ( q ϕ − σ = ϕ ,    (19)   
where fx is the additional fixed labor cost for exporting. Provided that  , f / ) ( r f / ) ( r x x ϕ < ϕ  which 
we assume is the case, then the cutoff productivity for the exporting firm will exceed that for the 
domestic firm,  *
*
x ϕ > ϕ . Then the mass of exporting firms is computed as:  
     M d ) ( M M *
x x < ϕ ϕ μ ≡ ∫
∞
ϕ .       ( 2 0 )  
To close the model, we use the full employment condition and also zero expected profits 
for any entrant. The labor needed for domestic sales for a firm with productivity ϕ is 






ϕ ϕ μ + ϕ ϕ + ϕ ϕ μ + ϕ ϕ + =
*
x
d ) ( ] f / ) ( q [ M d ) ( ] f / ) ( q [ M f M L x x x x
*
e e ,   (21) 
where the distribution of productivities conditional on exporting is  )] ( G 1 /[ ) ( g ) (
*
x x ϕ − ϕ ≡ ϕ μ  if 
, *
x ϕ ≥ ϕ  and zero otherwise. We can rewrite (21) by multiplying by w, and using the fact that 
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where the second line is obtained using the definition of GDP, with zero expected profits. It 
follows immediately that there is a linear transformation curve between the mass of entering, 
domestic and exporting firms, that is:   15
    () . f M Mf f M L x x e e + + σ =       ( 2 2 )  
To obtain further results, we assume a Pareto distribution for productivities: 
θ − ϕ − = ϕ 1 ) ( G , with  0 1> − σ > θ .      ( 2 3 )  
In that case, it can be shown (see the Appendix) that the number of entering firms is proportional 
to the labor force,  e e f / ) 1 ( L M σθ − σ = , which was assumed by Chaney (2008), for example. So 
the transformation curve between domestic and export varieties is further simplified as: 
    () x xf M Mf
) 1 (
L +
+ σ − θ
σθ
= .       ( 2 4 )  
  The fact that this transformation curve is linear between the mass of domestic and 
exported varieties is similar to that found in the Krugman (1980) model, in (7). But this fact does 
not tell us about the transformation curve between the economy’s outputs, because we also need 
to take into account the quantity produced of each variety. In Krugman’s model, the quantity 
produced by each firm is fixed, as in (6), so the transformation is also linear in the quantity 
produced by any groups of firms. But in the Melitz (2003) model, only the zero-profit-cutoff 
firm has output identical to that in Krugman’s model, and the cutoff productivity  * ϕ  itself is 
endogenously determined. So to determine the transformation curve for the economy, we first 
need to determine the correct measure of output used to adjust the varieties M and Mx. 
  To determine the appropriate measure of quantity, it is convenient to invert the demand 
curve and treat revenue as a function of quantity, so from (14) we obtain:   





















P A .    (25)     16
We introduce the notation Ad as shift parameter in the demand curve facing home firms for their 
domestic sales. It depends on the CES price index 
H P , and also on domestic expenditure wL.  
Likewise, export revenue can be written as:   
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Integrating domestic and export revenue over firms, we obtain GDP: 














.   (27)   
Thus, in order to measure GDP the mass of domestic and export varieties are multiplied by the 
quantities shown above. Feenstra and Kee (2008) demonstrate that the first-order conditions for 
maximizing GDP subject to the resource constraint for the economy, taking A and Ax as given, 
are precisely the monopolistic competition equilibrium conditions. So the quantities appearing in 
this expression are the “right” way to adjust the mass of domestic and export varieties.  
  We can simplify these quantities by noting that CES demand, combined with constant-
markup prices in (15), imply that the quantity sold equals  ) ~ ( q ) ~ / ( ) ( q ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ σ  for any choice of 
reference productivity ϕ ~ . We follow Melitz (2003) in specifying ϕ ~  as average productivity: 
    
) 1 /( 1
) 1 (
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ϕ ϕ μ ϕ ≡ ϕ ∫ ,     ( 2 8 )  
and likewise for the average productivity  x
~ ϕ  for exporters, computed using 
*
x ϕ  and  x μ . It 
follows that GDP simply equals  ) M ~ A M ~ A ( x x d + , using the adjusted mass of varieties: 
   
σ − σ σ − σ ϕ ≡ ϕ ≡
/ ) 1 (
x x x x
/ ) 1 ( ) ~ ( q M M ~ and ) ~ ( Mq M ~ .    (29)   17
  To simplify this expression for GDP further, we note that a property of the Pareto 
distribution is that an integral like (28) is always a constant multiple of the lower bound of 
integration. That is: 
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) 1 (
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     ( 3 0 )  
as obtained by evaluating the integral in (28), which is finite provided that  1 − σ > θ . The cutoff 
productivity * ϕ is in turn related to the mass of firms by  M M *)] ( G 1 [ e δ = ϕ − , and using the 
mass of entering firms  e e f / ) 1 ( L M σθ − σ =  and the Pareto distribution, it follows that: 
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= ϕ θ − .       ( 3 1 )  
  Gathering together these results, we can use  *) ( q *) / ~ ( ) ~ ( q ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ σ to compute that the 
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where the second equality uses (30) and the ZCP condition  * f ) 1 ( *) ( q ϕ − σ = ϕ , and the third 
follows from (31), where k1> 0 depends on the parameters θ, σ and δ. Thus, the adjusted mass of 
domestic varieties is an increasing but nonlinear function of the mass M. A similar expression 
holds for exports, but replacing f, M, and M ~  with fx, Mx, and  x M ~ . Solving for M and Mx and 
substituting these into the linear transformation curve (24), we obtain a concave transformation 
curve between M ~  and  x M ~ , with elasticity  0 1 ) 1 ( > − ≡ ω − σ
θσ : 
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+ = ,    (32)   18
where k2 > 0 again depends on the parameters θ, σ and δ.  
  Summing up, from the Melitz (2003) model we have obtained a constant-elasticity 
transformation curve, with elasticity  , 0 1 ) 1 ( > − ≡ ω − σ
θσ  just like in (9) as we initially asserted. 
Our earlier results in Theorems 1 and 2 continue to apply to this transformation curve. In 
particular, consider the problem of maximizing  ) M ~ A M ~ A ( x x d +  subject to this transformation 
curve. This Lagrangian problem leads to the following solution, analogous to (10): 
 
Theorem 3 (Feenstra and Kee, 2008) 
Assume that the distribution of firm productivity in Pareto, as in (23). Then maximizing GDP 
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.   (33) 
 
The function  ) A , A ( e x d  is the revenue earned with L = 1 on the transformation curve, and 
equals wages. Note that the exponents appearing on the fixed costs f and fx in (33) are obtained 
as  . 0 1 ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 (





σ ω ω  This expression also appears as the exponent on fixed costs 
in the gravity equation of Chaney (2008). 
We can now apply Theorem 2 to compute the gain from trade. Denoting autarky by t–1 , 
the economy is at the corner of the transformation curve with  0 M ~ A 1 xt 1 xt = = − − , as illustrated 
by point A in Figure 5.  Using t to denote the trade situation, under free trade we have 
, 0 M ~ and 0 A xt xt > >  as at point C. We can therefore evaluate the gain from trade as the ratio of 
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where the first line follows from wages in Theorem 3; the second line follows from Theorem 2, 
using the domestic “price” Ad as the common good available both periods, with spending on 
domestic goods in period t of  t dt dt M ~ A R ≡ ; and the third line follows directly from the 
definition of Ad in (25).  
  We use this equation to solve for the ratio of real wages, obtaining the result: 
 
Theorem 4 (Arkolakis, et al, 2008a) 











































,     (35) 
where the final equality is obtained because  1 ) 1 ( − ≡ ω − σ
θσ , so  ( ) θ − σ
σ
+ ω = 1
1 ) 1 (
1 .  
 
  Note that the ratio of domestic expenditure  dt R  to total income  t tL w  is equal to one 
minus the import share, so this formula is identical to the gains from trade in the Krugman 
(1980) model, except that we replace the exponent  ) 1 (
1
− σ
−  in that case with  θ − 1  in (35). This 
result is precisely the result derived by Arkolakis et al (2008a), and remarkably, the elasticity of 
substitution σ does not enter the formula at all (except insofar as it affects the import share). Our   20
derivation gives some intuition as to where this simple formula comes from. Namely, the 
movement from a corner of the transformation curve A in Figure 5, with exports equal to zero, to 
an interior position like C, gives rise to gains equal to one minus the import (or export) share 
with the exponent  ) 1 (
1
+ ω
− , which is a straightforward application of Theorem 2 on the production 
side of the economy. We might interpret these gains as due to export variety. These gains are 
shown in the second line of (34), and reflect the increase in wages due to the productivity 
improvement as the exporting firms drive out less productive domestic firms. But in addition, 
this productivity improvement drives down prices, and therefore further increase real wages: that 
is shown as we substitute for the endogenous value of Ad, and thereby solve for real wages in 
(35). Through these two channels, the gains equal one minus the import (or export) share with 





1  in absolute value. 
  But what about any further gain due to import variety? Now we must be careful, because 
the Melitz model leads to the exit of domestic firms and therefore a reduction in domestic 
varieties, which must be weighted against the increase in import variety. Baldwin and Forslid 
(2004) argue that the total number of product varieties falls with trade liberalization, whereas 
Arkolakis et al (2008) show that it can rise or fall. But simply counting the total number of 
varieties is not the right way to evaluate the welfare gains: instead, we need to take the ratio 
) 1 /( 1
1 t t ) / ( − σ −
− λ λ  on the consumption side of the economy, as in Theorem 2. As we now show,  
this ratio turns out to be unity: the gains due to new import varieties are exactly offset for 
reduced domestic varieties. Therefore, the production-side gains we have already identified in 
Theorem 4 are all that is available. 
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,   (36)  
where 
* F
x ϕ  denotes the zero-profit-cutoff for the foreign exporters, with prices  ) ( p
F ϕ . This CES 
price index is conceptually identical to what we referred to as the unit-expenditure function in 
(2). The average prices of domestic goods appearing in (36) are: 





































ϕ ϕ μ ϕ ∫ ,    (37) 
which uses the prices (15) together with the definition of average productivity in (28).  
  When comparing autarky (denoted by t–1) with free trade (denoted by t), we need to take 
into account the changing price of domestic goods and their changing variety, as in (37), along 
with the fact the all imported goods are new. Applying Theorem 2 gives rise to the following  
ratio of unit-expenditures: 
































= .    (38) 
The first term appearing on the right of (38) is just the change in the average price of domestic 
goods, reflecting the change in wages and in average productivity. The aggregate domestic good 
is available in both periods, so the first term reflects the Sato-Vartia index PSV over the 
“common”  good in Theorem 2. The numerator of the second term on the right is the spending on 
domestic goods relative to total spending in period t; this equals λt in Theorem 2, or one minus 
the share of spending on new imported varieties. The denominator of the second term is λt-1 in 
Theorem 2, and reflects the reduction in the number of domestic varieties, Mt < Mt-1.   22
  We now show that  1 t t M / M − = t t dt L w / R  in (38), so the reduction in the number of 
domestic varieties just cancels with share of spending on new imported varieties, and there are 
no further consumption gains. This result is obtained from the ZCP condition for domestic firms, 
in (16). The second expression appearing in (16) is  * f ) 1 ( *) ( q ϕ − σ = ϕ , which is familiar from 
the Krugman model – see (7). We will combine this with the first expression appearing in (16), 
wf / *) ( r = σ ϕ , which can be rewritten using the inverse demand curve in (25), to obtain: 
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Using the definition  σ ≡ / 1 H H
d ) P / wL ( P A , we readily simplify this expression as: 
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Now using the ZCP condition that  * f ) 1 ( *) ( q ϕ − σ = ϕ , we immediately obtain: 





























,       ( 3 9 )  
so that the increase in real wages reflects the increase in the ZCP productivities. From (30) the 
ratio of ZCP productivities equals the ratio of average productivities,  ) ~ / ~ ( 1 t t − ϕ ϕ , then comparing 
(38) with (39) we immediately see that  1 t t M / M − =  t t dt L w / R , as we intended to show. 
  This finding that there are no additional consumption gains from variety in the Melitz 
(2003) model, which is implicit in Arkolakis et al (2008a), is discussed explicitly by di Giovanni 
and Levchenko (2009), who argue that if the distribution of firm size follows Zipf’s Law then the 
extensive margin of imports accounts for a vanishing small portion of the total gains from trade. 
Their model differs somewhat from our discussion above because firms also use differentiated   23
intermediate inputs, but they still assume a Pareto distribution for productivities. This assumption 
implies that the distribution of firms by size follows a power distribution, which correspond to 
Zipf’s Law as  ). 1 ( − σ → θ  That is the case where they find that the extensive margin of imports 
has a vanishing contribution to the gains from trade. In comparison, our results above are more 
general because we show that the extensive margin of imports has a welfare contribution that just 
cancels with the reduced extensive margin of domestic goods, and this result holds for all 
). 1 ( − σ > θ  
  These results from the Melitz (2003) model obviously challenge the empirical finding of 
Broda and Weinstein (2008), who treated domestic varieties as unchanged. In the next section, 
we consider an alternative framework to CES that allows for changes in domestic varieties as 
well as changes in the markups charged by firms. Changing markups have already been 
introduced in theory by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), using a quadratic utility function with an 
additively separable numeraire good, leading to linear demand functions. As useful as that 
framework is, its zero income elasticities suggest that in empirical application it is best suited for 
partial equilibrium analysis. We will consider instead a translog expenditure function, which has 
income elasticities of unity and price elasticities that are not constant. 
  Before turning to the translog case, we conclude by noting that the gains from trade in the 
Melitz (2003) model have been estimated on the production side of the economy. Intuitively, 
movements along the transformation curve in Figure 5 due to greater export variety will be 
associated with higher GDP and productivity. That hypothesis is strongly confirmed empirically 
by Feenstra and Kee (2008). They analyze 48 countries exporting to the U.S. over 1980–2000, 
and find that average export variety to the United States increases by 3.3% per year, so it nearly 
doubles over these two decades. That total increase in export variety is associated with a   24
cumulative 3.3% productivity improvement for exporting countries, i.e. after two decades, GDP 
is 3.3% higher than otherwise due to growth in export variety, on average. That estimate is 
greater than the welfare gains for the U.S. found by Broda and Weinstein (2006), which was that 
after 30 years, real GDP was 2.6% higher than otherwise due to growth in import variety. Of 
course, because the U.S. has a low import share we might expect to find greater gains to 
exporters, but these results still demonstrate that the gains on the production side of the economy 
can be substantial.  
 
4.  Translog Expenditure Function 
  We turn now to consider a translog unit-expenditure function. In a monopolistic 
competition model we need to be explicit about which goods and available and which are not, so 
let N
~
 denote the maximum number of goods conceivably available, which we treat as fixed. The 
translog unit-expenditure function (Diewert ,1976) is defined as:
9 
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γ + α + α = , with γij = γji  and αi > 0.    (40) 
Note that the restriction that γij = γji is made without loss of generality. To ensure that the 
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The share of each good in expenditure is obtained by differentiating (40) with  
respect to  i p ln , obtaining: 
∑
=




j ij i i p ln s .        ( 4 2 )  
                                                 
9 The translog direct and indirect utility functions were introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975), and 
the expenditure function in (40) was proposed by Diewert (1976, p. 122).   25
These shares must be non-negative, of course, but we will allow for a subset of goods to have  
zero shares because they are not available for purchase. To be precise, suppose that si > 0 for  
i=1,…,N, while sj = 0 for j=N+1,…, N
~
. Then for the latter goods, we set sj = 0 within the share 
equations (42), and use these  ) N N ~ ( −  equations to solve for the reservation prices  j p ~ ,  
j=N+1,…, N
~
, in terms of the observed prices pi, i=1,…,N.  
 
  Solving for the reservation prices introduces a level of complexity that did not arise in the 
CES case, where reservation prices are infinite: in the expenditure function (2), an infinite 
reservation price raised to the negative power  ) 1 ( σ −  simply vanishes. To solve for finite 
reservation prices in the translog case, it is essential to simplify the translog by imposing the 
additional “symmetry” requirements: 
, j i for 0
N ~ and , 0
N ~
1 N ~
ij ii ≠ >
γ






γ − = γ  with i, j = 1,…,N
~
. (43) 
It is readily confirmed that the restrictions in (43) satisfy the homogeneity conditions (41), and 
also guarantee that the reservation prices are finite. Because N
~
 is a fixed number, (43) simply 
says that the Γ matrix has a negative constant on the diagonal, and a positive constant on the off-
diagonal, chosen so that the rows and columns sum to zero.  
  The restrictions in (43) are not familiar from the translog literature, but are essential to 
solve for reservation prices for goods not available. Note that we have not restricted the αi > 0 
parameters, though they must sum to unity as in (41), so there are  1 N ~ −  free αi parameters.
 10 In 
addition, we have the free parameter α0 in (40) as well as γ > 0 in (43), so there are a total of  
1 N ~ +  free parameters in this “symmetric” translog function. That is the same number of free 
                                                 
10 Feenstra (2003) adds an additional symmetry restriction on the αi parameters, but Bergin and Feenstra (2009) 
show that Theorem 5 below can be obtained without that restriction.   26
parameters in our “non-symmetric” CES function (1), where we allowed for N ~  parameters ai > 0 
(possibly changing over time) along with the elasticity σ > 1. So in describing the translog case 
as “symmetric” we are comparing it to the empirical version that does not use (43); while in 
describing the CES function as “non-symmetric” we are comparing it to the theoretical version in 
monopolistic competition models that assumes  1 ai ≡ , i = 1…,N ~ . In fact, both the CES function 
in (1) and the translog in (40) have the same number of free parameters, or degree of symmetry, 
which we have chosen to be tractable in a monopolistic competition framework. 
  The usefulness of the symmetric restrictions in  (43) is shown by the following result: 
 
Theorem 5 (Feenstra, 2003; Bergin and Feenstra, 2009) 
Using the symmetry restrictions (43), suppose that only the goods i=1,…,N are available, so the 
reservation prices  j p ~  for j=N+1,…, N
~
 are used. Then the unit-expenditure function equals: 
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Notice that the expenditure function in (44) looks like a conventional translog function 
defined over the goods i=1,…,N, while the symmetry restrictions continue to hold in (45), but 
are defined now using the number of available goods N, which can change over time. As N 
grows, for example, we find that the price elasticity of demand also grows because goods are   27
closer substitutes. To interpret (46), it implies that each of the coefficient αi is increased by the 
same amount to ensure that the coefficients ai sum to unity over i=1,…,N. The final term a0, 
appearing in (47), incorporates the coefficients αi of the unavailable products. If the number of 
available products N rise, then a0 falls, indicating a welfare gain from increasing the number of 
available products.  
Theorem 5 is a promising start towards using the translog function in monopolistic 
competition models. For theoretical work, this result is all that is needed and it shows that the 
translog system can join the quadratic preferences used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) as being 
tractable alternatives to the CES case. Furthermore, both the translog and quadratic preferences 
allow for endogenous markups.
11 The real advantage of the translog unit-expenditure function is 
on empirical grounds. As argued by Diewert (1976), it has a number of convenient properties: it 
is obtained from homothetic preferences, provides a second-order approximation to an arbitrary 
expenditure function, and corresponds to the Törnqvist price index, which is very close to price 
index formulas that are used in practice.  
Feenstra and Weinstein (2009) develop an alternative formula for the welfare gain from 
new products, beyond Theorem 5, that depends on the observable expenditure shares on goods 
and can therefore be implemented. The terms appearing in the formula for the welfare gain are 
analogous to those appearing in (47), but using observable expenditure shares in place of  i α : the 
welfare gain from new products depends on the sum of squared shares, and on the square of the 
sum of shares, of new products. The sum of squared product shares – or Herfindahl indexes – 
also determine the average markups charged by firms in each market. Increased shares of 
imports and reduced U.S. shares can lead to reduced U.S. markups, and also contribute to variety 
                                                 
11  For other functional forms that allow for endogenous markups see Behrens et al (2008) and Simonovska (2008).    28
gains. For these reasons, the translog case offers a promising theoretical and empirical 
framework to assess the gains from import variety and the effect of imports on reducing 
markups. 
 
5.  Conclusions   
This paper is about measurement: how to measure the gains from trade that arise in the 
monopolistic competition model. The CES functional form, introduced into the monopolistic 
competition model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and adopted by Krugman (1980, 1981) and later 
literature, is just as convenient in empirical work as it is in theory. Using this functional form, 
Feenstra (1994) showed how the gains from new product varieties depend on their expenditure 
share as well as on the elasticity of substitution. The expenditure on new imported products, or 
more precisely, on new source countries for imports, are available from highly disaggregate 
trade statistics. In addition, estimates of the elasticity of substitution between source countries for 
imports can be obtained using the same disaggregate trade statistics over time, as described in 
Feenstra (1994). Broda and Weinstein (2006) applied these methods to import data for the 
United States, and find that the gains from new source countries for imports can be substantial: 
by 2001, these gains amount to 2.6% of U.S. GDP.  
Recently, attention has shifted in the monopolistic competition literature to the 
production side of the economy. Whereas Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980, 1981) 
relied on the “symmetry” assumption that all firms are identical, Melitz (2003) was able to 
introduce heterogeneity in the productivity of firms. This framework allows firms to have 
stochastic draws of productivity, but still imposes that firm profits are zero ex ante, as required 
by free entry into the industry. This extension to the monopolistic competition model is well-
grounded in empirical observations: it allows for only a subset of firms in the industry – the more   29
efficient firms – to be exporters. In the Canadian context, Trefler (2004) showed that the exit of 
less-efficient firms led to a substantial increase in average industry productivity following the 
Canada-U.S. free trade agreement, which supports the Melitz model. 
  We have explored the industry-level implications of the Melitz model, and found that it 
leads to a concave, constant-elasticity transformation curve between domestic and export 
varieties, adjusting for the appropriate quantity of each. Analogous to the CES results on the 
consumer side, the gains from trade depend on the share of revenue devoted to exports and on 
the elasticity of transformation, which itself depends on the elasticity of substitution and on the 
Pareto parameter for productivity draws. Remarkably, once we take into account the general 
equilibrium increase in spending following trade liberalization (i.e. endogeneity of the shift 
parameters Adt), then the gains from trade simplify so that they depend on the share of revenue 
devoted to exports (or equivalently, imports), and on the Pareto parameter. This confirms the 
very simple formula for the gains from trade found by Arkolakis et al (2008a,b). All these gains 
come from the production side of the economy, and there are no further gains from product 
variety on the consumption side: the gains from import varieties just cancel with the losses from 
reduced domestic varieties. That results follows from having an “interior solution” where only a 
fraction of the domestic firms are exporters: if all firms exported or no firms exported in some 
industries, then we would expect to again see consumption gains from variety as in Krugman 
(1980, 1981). 
The final topic we have discussed is the gains from trade due to reduced markups charged 
by firms, as in Krugman (1979). It is worth emphasizing that these are social gains and not just a 
transfer from firms to consumers. In Krugman (1979), reduced markups combined with zero 
profits in equilibrium imply that firms are moving down their average cost curves, taking greater   30
advantage of economies of scale. So the reduction in consumer prices due to reduced markups do 
not come at the expense of firms profits. In order to measure these gains we must move beyond 
the CES case, however, where markups are constant. In theory, the quadratic utility function 
used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) offers a very useful form of endogenous markets. Because 
this utility function uses an additively separable numeraire good, all other products all have 
income elasticities of zero. On empirical grounds, we recommend instead the translog unit-
expenditure function, which corresponds to homothetic preferences (income elasticities of unity). 
Unlike the CES case, goods then have finite reservation prices that must be solved for. Feenstra 
(2003) and Bergin and Feenstra (2009) show how this expenditure function, when simplified to 
allow for some “symmetry” across goods, has a convenient solution for the reservation prices 
that can be substituted back into the expenditure function, obtaining a tractable form even as the 
number of goods varies. Feenstra and Weinstein (2009) are making use of this functional form to 
estimate the impact of globalization on markets and product variety in the U.S. market. It can be 
expected that applications to many other countries will follow, thereby allowing us measure this 
third source of gains from trade due to monopolistic competition.  31
Appendix 
Using  () x x e e f M Mf f M L + + σ =  and the full employment condition, we have that: 
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where the first line uses  *) ( q *) / ( ) ( q ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ
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Substituting these in to the full employment condition above we obtain: 
    () x xf M Mf
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+ σ − θ
σθ
= , 
from which it follows that  e e f / ) 1 ( L M σθ − σ = . 
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Figure 2: CES Indifference Curve  36
 









         







   
   












































          
Figure 5: Constant-Elasticity Transformation Curve in Melitz (2003) 
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